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ABSTRACT
This paper explores three factors--public policy, the Japanese (national) innovation system, and
knowledge--that influence technological innovation in Japan. To establish a context for the paper,
we examine Japanese culture and the U.S. and Japanese patent systems in the background
section. A brief history of the Japanese aircraft industry as a source of knowledge and technology
for other industries is presented. Japanese and U.S. alliances and linkages in three
sectors--blotechnology, semiconductors, and large commercial aircraft (LCA)--and the
importation, absorption, and diffusion of knowledge and technology are examined next. The paper
closes with implications for diffusing knowledge and technology, U.S. public policy, and LCA.
INTRODUCTION
The technological advancements and achievements made by post-World War II Japan are nothing
short of extraordinary. The Japanese "economic miracle," as it is often called, remains the focus
of scholars and pollcymakers. Indeed, the number of essays, articles, studies, dissertations, and
books dealing with Japan is voluminous and shows no signs of abatement. At the heart of these
inquiries is the search for the answer to the two-part question, "What is the secret of Japan's
economic success? and once known, "can the secret be applied successfully to the United States'
economy?"
Currently, the United States has a bilateral trade deficit with Japan that accounts for about
40% of the overall U.S. trade deficit. Knowing the factors that contribute to Japan's economic
achievements and that nation's ability to develop and commercialize technology becomes
essential ffthe United States is to strengthen its ability to compete and partner with Japan in the
global economy. The secret of Japan's success is actually a combination of several factors. In
this chapter, we have assembled these factors into three groupsDpubllc policy, the Japanese
(national) innovation system, and knowledge. Japanese public policy (e.g., economic, industrial,
and technology) is focused, consistent, pragmatic, and adaptive, and it recognizes that knowledge
and technological leadership are critical to national economic performance (He, 1993; Im_ai, 1991;
Komiya, Okuno, and Suzumura, 1988). Although Ergas (1987) considers Japanese technology
policies to be unique and, thus, neither "mission- nor diffusion-oriented," these policies do
incorporate many "diffusion-like" features identified by Branscomb (1993) and previously in
Chapters 3, 4, and 17. Chief among these are the capacity to adjust to technological change
across the entire industry structure and the effective diffusion of imported and domestically
produced knowledge and technology (Frankel and Kahler, 1993).
Of particular importance is the role played by the Ministry of International Trade and Industry
(MITI), the leading state actor in the Japanese economy (Johnson, 1982; Samuels, 1994). MITI
maintains close and continual contact with industry, fosters industrial collaboration and the
diffusion of knowledge among firms, and uses industry associations and advisory conunlttees to
review and endorse technology projects and policies (Cheney and Grimes, 1991 ). As a matter of
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national policy, MITI nurtures the development of such knowledge-intensive industries as aircraft
manufacturing as sources of knowledge that can be "spun on" to other industries. It fosters
research collaborations, alliances, and linkages as a means of accessing and importing (external)
knowledge and technology. MITI also provides low-cost loans and facilitates the creation of such
"program partnerships" as the Japanese Aircraft Development Corporation (JADC) in order to
promote Japanese industry involvement in a variety of projects, including JADC's participation
as a risk-sharing subcontractor in the Boeing 777 project.
Innovation, a catalyst for growth, can be divided into three types---organizational, product, and
technological (Maklno, 1987). Organizational innovation in Japan has been achieved by stream-
lining the structure of the company, wisely managing the enterprise (Basadur, 1992; Sakakibara
and Westney, 1992), and organizing the production and distribution systems to optimize
marketing and export goals. Product innovation in Japan involves the manufacture of goods that
reflect customer requirements and are readily adaptable to changes in consumer behavior and
spending. Technological innovation in Japan involves the importation, absorption and adaptation
of, and the development of new knowledge and technology to produce new products, processes,
or services and to improve existing ones (Herbig, 1995). Technological innovation in Japan, as
distinguished from that in the United States, is characterized by, among other things, globallzation
and international networks and international collaboration (Fransman, 1991 ). It is also distin-
guished from that in the United States by its culture and patent system (Kotler and Hamilton,
1995) and the use and management of knowledge (Hedlund and Nonaka, 1993).
Japanese companies are exceptional innovators. Japanese firms, as described by Nonaka and
Takeuchi (1995), are knowledge companies that are constantly importing and creating knowledge,
diffusing it throughout the organization, and quickly embodying it in new and existing products,
processes, or services. The firms' efforts are assisted by a (national) system of innovation that
stimulates research and development (R&D), promotes technological innovation (Odaglri and Goto,
1993), and excels at taking knowledge and technology from around the world and using them to
develop and improve products, processes, or services (Cheney and Grimes, 1991 ). Westney (1993)
states that a widespread consensus has emerged on some key characteristics of the technological
behavior of Japanese firms, when compared to those in the United States: (a) shorter (product)
development time cycles; (b) more effective design for manufacturabllity; (c) more incremental
product, process, and service improvement; (d) innovation dominated by large, rather than small
firms; (e) a stronger propensity to competitive matching of products and processes; (f) a greater
propensity for interflrm collaboration in developing and diffusing technology; (g) a higher propen-
sity to patent; (h) weakness in science-based industries, and (i) more effective identification and
acquisition of external knowledge and technology on a global scale. Japan has created numerous
alliances and linkages to compensate for weakness in science-based industries and to acquire
external knowledge and technology, a point repeated throughout the paper.
For the past 40 years, Japan has benefitted significantly from the knowledge (explicit and tacit)
and technology that have flowed to it from the United States. This largely one-way diffusion of
knowledge and technology is the result of proactive participation by both the Japanese
government and private sector firms in the importation and diffusion of knowledge (Arrison,
Bergsten, Graham, and Harris, 1992). The strategies employed include: Ca) explicit or codified
knowledge, such as that contained in books, journals, and drawings; (b) tacit knowledge by hiring
engineers, scientists, and technicians trained in the U.S. and by sending Japanese to study
abroad; and (c) entire product and process technologies through foreign and direct investment
(Imai, 1991; Odagiri and Goto, 1993; Okimoto, 1986). (See Peck and Goto, 1981, for the
importation of[external] knowledge and technology and their use by Japan to promote economic
growth.) In addition, the Japanese have benefitted from the learning-by-doing and learning-by-
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using acquired through the licensed manufacture and production and co-production of U.S.-made
products and the maintenance and repair of U.S. aircraft. Japan has a number of governmental
and quasi-governmental organizations such as the Japanese Information Center for Science and
Technology (JICST) that collect information worldwide in virtually all fields of pure and applied
science and technology. (See Morita. 1991, for insight into the infrastructure of Japanese
information.) Further, the Japanese have mastered what has become known as "competitive
intelligence," the collecting, analyzing, delivering, and using of publicly available Information for
competitive advantage (Hansen, 1996; Kokubo, 1993). Various government policies, such as the
mandatory six years of pre-college English training required of Japanese students, increase the
usability and value of foreign language information.
The diffusion of knowledge is encouraged by the fact that Japanese industries and firms have
developed cooperative vertical, and sometimes horizontal, relationships. The kelretsu, a group of
cooperative, and often subcontracting, firms is an example (Johnson, 1982; Samuels, 1994). A
long-term, semi-fixed relationship between users and suppliers and among affiliated firms,
subcontractors, vendors, and others enables the participants to share information about the
nature of technology and the products involved. The long-term transaction involved in such
relationships includes not only an economic component, but also a social one comprised of trust,
loyalty, and power (Imal, 1991). Finally, the importation, absorption, diffusion, and application
of knowledge and technology are facilitated by a number of factors in the Japanese culture
(Stewart, 1987; Tudjman, 1991; Phillips, 1993), a point on which we expand in the background
section of the paper.
Three factors--publlc policy, the Japanese (national) innovation system, and knowledgemthat
influence technological innovation in Japan are presented in this paper. To establish a context
for the chapter, we examine Japanese culture and the Japanese patent system in the background
section. A brief history of the Japanese aircraft industry as a example of the importation,
absorption, and diffusion of knowledge and technology to other industries is presented. Japanese
and U.S. alliances and linkages in three sectorsmbiotechnology, semiconductors, and large
commercial aircraft (LCA)--and the importation, absorption, and diffusion of knowledge and
technology are examined next. The paper closes with implications for diffusing knowledge and
technology, U.S. public policy, and LCA.
BACKGROUND
A number of factors, individually and collectively, affect the diffusion of knowledge at the
individual, organizational, national, and international levels and the process of technological
innovation. To establish the chapter's context, two factors--Japanese culture and the Japanese
patent system_are presented that influence the organization and diffusion of knowledge in Japan
serve to distinguish innovation in Japan from that in the United States.
Japanese Culture
Cultural, ontological, and epistemological principles influence the organization and diffusion
of knowledge in a society (Crane, 1995). A variety of cultural determinants is responsible for the
unique position that knowledge holds in Japanese society. Although the Japanese attitude
towards science and the organization of knowledge assumes similar organizational and
phenomenal forms as in Western countries, the attitude is based on different cultural princlples.
For example, in Chapter 3, we explained that in the U.S., the results of science that are paid for
with public (i.e., taxpayer) money are considered to be public knowledge. Hence, scientific
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knowledge is published and made accessible to any and all for critical assessment. Science in
Japan is formed not as public knowledge but as corporate knowledge; knowledge belongs first to
the corporation; it is acquired and developed, organized, and used chiefly within the corporation
as Inslder knowledge. Thus, knowledge is neither individual nor public property (Tudjman, 1991 ).
Furthermore, in Japan, knowledge is a commodity and possessing knowledge is a privilege.
Certain of these determinants--the propensity to work together in groups, a willingness to
subsume individual interests to the greater good, and an emphasis on consensual
decisionmaking-- have a direct bearing on the ability of Japanese firms to form alliances and to
compete in international markets. Certain determinants or attributes in Japanese
culture--collectivism, Wa (harmony), Girl (obligations and expectations), and acceptance of au-
thority-influence the organization and diffusion of knowledge in Japan. (See Herbig, 1995,
Chapter 6.) Researchers have investigated how these attributes affect the communication of
knowledge between Japan and Western cultures, principally the United States (Ford and
Honeycutt, 1992; Goldman, 1994; Kato and Kato, 1992; Maher and Wong, 1994; McNamara and
Hayashi, 1994; Ohsumi, 1995).
In following section, we review six cultural determinants---4a) group think vs, individual
expression, (b) differences in high-context and low-context communications, (c) attitudes about
contractual agreements. (d) the influence of religion on Japanese culture, (e) "mental telepathy"
and *apparent" vs. "real" messages as communications norms, (f) surface/bottomline messages,
and (g) the Japanese preference for informal (oral) communications over formal (written)
communications--to assess how these determinants influence the organization and diffusion of
knowledge in Japan. Although our review provides useful insights into understanding howcultu re
affects the organization and diffusion of knowledge in Japan, our review is not exhaustive.
Missing from this discussion, for example, is the influence of linguistics and non-verbal
communication.
Group think vs. Indlvldual expression. Perhaps the most striking feature that distinguishes
the organization and diffusion of knowledge in Japan from that of Westerners is the concept of
group think based on hierarchy. Ford and Honeycutt (1992) trace the existence of a hierarchical
structure to Confucianism that was brought from China to Japan during the fifth century.
Confucianism teaches that "the need for submission to elders and those of superior position in
the group" is a prerequisite of a society (Ford and Honeycutt, 1992, p. 31). Group think is an
extension of the holism in society that provides a basis for corporate decision making (McNamara
and Hayashi, 1994, p. 7}. Individualism, which is cherished in the West. is not considered a
virtue in Japanese society. The Japanese expression, "the nail that stands up will be pounded
down," exemplifies the clear distaste for individualism that most Westerners note as one of the
distinct features of Japanese unwritten codes (Maher and Wong, 1994, p. 43; Buckett, 1991, p.
88). In considering the role of the individual in society, Nakane (1972) asserts that an individual
is defined by an attribute that makes up a frame. A group or a frame is formed when individuals
share common attributes (Nakane, 1972, p. 7). Thus, the individual has meaning only within the
context of a group. The notion of collectivism is ubiquitous from private to public, from family to
corporate organizations, and from local to national levels. The emphasis on harmony among
individuals in groups mirrors "the communal ethic of Shinto" (Maher and Wong, 1994, p. 43); it
is assumed that the homogeneous nature of Japanese society makes it possible to carry out group
think.
High context/low context communication. Hall and Hall (1987) define a high context (HC)
communication as one in which most of the information is already in the person, while very little
is in the coded, explicit, transmitted part of the message. A low context (LC) communication is
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just the opposite; that is, the mass of the information is vested in the explicit code (p. 8). Japan
has never been invaded by another nation. Thus, a homogeneous and isolated Japanese society
could afford to foster HC communication in which almost everyone understands the beliefs,
principles, and assumptions about how to go about interacting with people (McNamara and
Hayashi, 1994, p. I0). Conversely, the United States is a heterogeneous, LC society in which a
melting pot approach to communication is the norm. In a society whose citizens have diverse
national and ethnic backgrounds, it is inevitable that everything to be communicated to others
has to be described explicitly. Assumptions also have to be explained because there is no single
set of beliefs or rules of conduct governing society. Therefore, "explicit digital and verbal
communication is an essential element in Western, and especially American, culture" (McNamara
and Hayashi, 1994, p. I0). It is worth mentioning that there is always a danger in classifying
everything in dichotomous fashion. For example, Inaba (1988) argues that Hall and Hall's (I 987)
classification of Japanese and U.S. citizens as HC and LC respectively may be shortsighted, for
it excludes nonverbal behavior. However, the literature supports Hall and Hall's (1987)
assertions about Japanese and U.S. communications norms.
Contractual agreements. The concept of a contractual agreement is foreign to the Japanese.
Nakane (1972)states that "any sense of contract is completely lacking in the Japanese, and to
hope for any change along the lines of a contractual relationship is almost useless" (p. 80). The
influence of common law may provide the foundation of contractual agreements that are so
important in the United States. Goldman (1994) suggests that It is so important for Japanese to
acknowledge other people based on nlngensei or "human beingness" that there is no room for logic
or rules to be laid out (p. 235). Ohsumi (1995) also stresses the fact that U.S. society is based on
rules, but Japanese society has low regard for rules. The Japanese preference to do without
contracts and rules may be related to such cultural attributes as group think and HC. In Ja-
panese society, it is assumed that everyone communicates under the same preexisting set of
beliefs; therefore, there is no need to spell out explicitly what is expected or to establish written
rules.
The influence of religion. In Japan, religious beliefs are assumed to be an integral part of
an individual's history. Although Japanese society is experiencing a noticeable decline in
religious affiliation, religious ritual, symbolism, and attitude continue to play an important role
among the Japanese people (Maher and Wong, 1994). The Japanese are deeply influenced by
ideas and concepts coming from animism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Shinto, Taoism, and Zen.
Elements of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Shinto continue to affect the daily lives of the
Japanese although the trend toward secularism noted recently in the West actually began almost
three centuries ago in Japan (Relchauer and Jansen, 1995, p. 203). The strong work ethic and
an emphasis on harmony come from Confucianism. Matsuda ( 1991 ) correlates the ideas of group
actions, shared responsibility, harmony, and a strong loyalty to the group with Buddhism, which
teaches that everything in nature has life, and therefore one's life is a part of nature (p. 106).
Shinto has been the official national religion since the Melji Restoration of 1868. Originating from
Buddhism, Shinto evolved as a set of beliefs associated with the foundation myths of Japan and
with the cult of imperial ancestors. Shinto focused attention within a Japan that was becoming
more nationalistic and "eventually came to seek a new unity under symbolic imperial rule"
(Reichauer and Jansen, 1995, p. 209).
Traditional mental telepathy: Ishin-denshin and Haragei . As a homogeneous society,
Japan has nurtured its people to communicate according to the principle of lshin-densh|n or "if
it is In one heart, it will be transmitted to another heart" (Kato and Kato, 1992, p. x). In essence,
a message should be conveyed to a receiver without using many words because both parties are
capable of understanding each other wordlessly. Gudykunst and Nishida (1993) describe
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Inshln-denshln as "traditional mental telepathy" (p. 150), for it assumes that a transmitted
message will be understood by a receiver. Inshln-denshln is closely related to another Japanese
concept haragel, literally meaning "belly language." Haragel can be understood as "the center of
abdominal respiration that is in charge ofkl, which is the mind and the body that acts almost like
air that is inhaled and exhaled by a person" (Lebra, 1993, p. 65).
Surface/bottomllne messages (Tatemae/Honne). Human relationships in Japan have two
sides, tatemae and honne. "Tatemae is front face or what is presented and honne is true feelings
privately held" (Hall and Hall, 1985, p. 61 ). "Honne is what a person really wants to do, and
tatemae is his submission to moral obligation" (Gudykunst and Nishida, 1993, p. 152). The
Japanese have two modes of communication; tatemae Is a formal communication and honne is
the language of the heart (Kato and Kato, 1992, p. 22). Tatemae usually is exchanged during
business hours and honne surfaces outside office hours. The meanings oftatemae and honne are
closely associated with what Ford and Honeycutt (1992) call "surface or appearance vs. result or
bottomline" (p. 29). The same concepts can be thought of as "the apparent versus real" (Maher
and Wong, 1994, p. 44). The Japanese tend to place greater importance on process than the
results (Ford and Honeycutt, p. 291. Thus, such seemingly meaningless rituals as an exchange
of business cards and conversations without much essence in tatemae mode can be viewed as a
way of showing respect for each other.
Emphasis on informal communication. The literature establishes that the Japanese rely
heavily on informal communication (Kato and Kato, 1992). Personal contact or *knowing who"
is extremely important. Of course, informal communication is very important in the U.S., but for
the Japanese, informal communication has some peculiar features. For example, "the old boys'
network provides links to practically every board room, laboratory, and factory in Japan" (Cutler,
1989, p. 22). This network is based on alumni networks of major colleges and universities that
actually connect academia, government, and industry. Kokubo (1992) notes that "researchers
make courtesy calls on university professors, who serve as middlemen to relay information to their
networks of alumni" (p. 34). In addition to relying on colleges and universities, the Japanese
extend their networking capability through such various "people links" as professional societies,
consulting groups, collaborative work groups, and professional and technical conferences and
meetings (Cutler, 1989, p. 20).
Information gathering through informal contacts is central to the idea of Japanese competitive
intelligence. Kokubo (1992) states that "competitive intelligence consists of: (a) gathering technical
information, (b) distributing the acquired information to "linking agents," and (c) analyzing and
arranging information for decision-making" (p. 35). In Japanese business and industry, each
project has a "champion" who works with staff members in the technology information office and
patent department, senior researchers, and information professionals (e.g., librarians). Japanese
managers at all levels are expected to gather, disseminate, and utilize the latest information
available through the company grapevine and from industry-wide conferences and trade shows,
zalbatsu groups or clubs, and business, professional, and technical societies (Kokubo, 1992).
Japanese Patent System
Intellectual property is the broad definition for intangible assets owned or claimed by
individuals, corporations, or other entities that are the product of creativity, knowledge, and
innovation. Intellectual property rights are the legal rights that are provided for the various forms
of lntellectual propertyDpatents, copyrights, service marks, trademarks, mask works, industrial
designs, and trade secrets. As noted by Kotler and Hamilton (1995), the World Intellectual
Property Organization (WIPO) defines intellectual property as:
Pinelll, Barclay, and Kotler
7
the rights relating to literary, artistic, and scientific works: performances of performing artists,
phonograms, and broadcasts: inventions in all fields of human endeavor, scientific discoveries:
industrial designs: trademarks, service marks and commercial names and designations: protection
against unfair competition: and all other rights resulting from intellectual activity in the industrial.
scientific, literary, or artistic fields. (p. 1 1)
A patent is a legal right granted for a limited period of time by a national government or an
international intergovernmental authority to individuals so that they may profit from their
inventive labor. Patents are generally granted for new or improvements to existing products,
processes, or designs. (A patent awarded by the United States government grants its owner, or
holder, the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the product, process, or design
in the U.S.) A patent system fulfills two roles--it provides legal protection for inventions and it
ensures that knowledge concerning the invention is made known to the public.
Prologue. A patent provides an inventor the legal means of preventing others from imitating
(i.e., producing and selling) the product, process, or design covered by the patent. This protection
also places the patent holder in a position to license the product, process, or design to others in
exchange for compensation. As noted in Chapter 3. it is the expectation of monetary reward that
theoretically provides the incentive to invent. Without protection, inventors could not receive a
return on their investment. Absent the expectation of a return on investment, the incentive to
invent is all but curtailed. Patents have been praised by some as providing the economic
incentives to innovate and condemned by others for creating monopolies that stifle competition
and create artificially high prices for consumers. As a means of appropriating economic return
on investment, patent protection is rarely so strong as to prevent an imitator from circumventing
it. Mansfield (1989) determined that inventing around a patent required substantially less cost
and takes less time than the original invention. Despite its imperfections, the patent system
appears to provide more protection and incentive to invent than those (systems) designed to
replace it. Economists have determined that "inventive activity responds elastically to the de-
mand price of an invention, implying that it is influenced by the correct incentive policy" (Herbig,
1995, p. 56). This, states Wyatt (1986), makes the private rewards proportional to the potential
social value of inventive output, which is precisely what the patent system is designed to achieve.
A patent system encourages the creation of ideas that represent departures from accepted
practice, particularly radical innovations (Herbig, 1995); inspires inventors to pursue different or
seemingly foolish ideas; spurs innovation; is important to a firm's corporate strategy; and is a
critical component of technology policy. The importance given patents is reflected in the Uruguay
Round of GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) in which intellectual property rights, of
which patents are a part, were a key part of GATT discussions.
A U,S. perspective. In the United States, patent rights are protected by statutes authorized
by the Constitution, Article 8, that states
The Congress shall have the Power...To protnote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing
for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries.
The legal framework established by the above quoted section of the Constitution emphasizes the
rights of the individual inventor. The U.S. statute is contained in Title 35 of the United States
Code and is interpreted and applied by the federal courts. The U.S. Patent Act of 1952 is a
codification of common law, Judicial precedent, and statute dating back to 1790. The patent
statute has been revised substantially on several occasions since it was created in 1790. the most
recent occurred in 1952. In the United States, patents are issued for significantly differentiated
items, are secret until issued, and the examination and granting of patents rights is the purview
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of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, an agency of the U.S. Department of Commerce. In
1993, the United States earned over 820 billion from international technology licensing.
Correspondingly, the international theft of intellectual property reportedly cost American
companies nearly $24 billion annually (Kotler and Hamilton, 1995).
As part of a decade of new technology policy initiatives undertaken during the 1980s and
early 1990s, the U.S. implemented several laws (e.g., Bayh-Dole Act) that changed patent practice
(i.e., law) throughout the government (Heaton, 1989). During this period the United States
undertook more aggressive methods of pursuing and enforcing patent infringement both in the
U.S. and abroad. In 1982, Congress created the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(CAFC) in Washington, DC to include a focus on patent-related cases. Decisions of the lower
District Courts in cases involving patents can be appealed directly to the CAFC. The Omnibus
Trade Act and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (P.L. 100-418) revised Article 37 of the United States
TariffAct of 1930; expanded the enforcement of process patents in the U.S. Patent Act of 1953,
and instituted a "Special" Section 301 list that identifies countries not having adequate and
effective protection of intellectuai property rights that could subject them to trade sanctions by
the United States. (These changes allow the U.S. to forbid the importation of goods solely on the
basis of patent infringement, extend effective protection of process patent internationally, and
generally broaden executive branch powers to enforce intellectual property rights.) Suits
concerning patents filed in U.S. courts have more than doubled since 1980. Japanese companies
have been particularly affected by U.S. government and American companies where substantial
damages for patent infringement were awarded against Japanese-owned companies. Landmark
cases include Honeywell Inc. v. Minolta Camera Co. Ltd. and Sanyo v. Texas Instruments.
A JapaneJe perspective. In Japan, patent rights are protected by the Patent Act of 1959,
which has been frequently amended. Japanese patent law, first codified in 1895, was patterned
after the German (Prussian) Code of Civil Procedure, but borrowed aspects from the French Civil
Procedure. Although judicial precedent is considered, statutory law prevails. Administrative
guidance and discretion influence decisions. The Japanese Patent Office (JPO) administers the
examination and granting of patent rights in Japan. The JPO is an agency of MITI and is under
the direct supervision of both MITIs Machinery and Information Industries and Trade Policy
Bureaus. The Patent Commissioner is a senior, career MITI official appointed by the MITI
Minister. After a two-to-three-year term, this official usually retires to a position as an advisor to
private industry (Kotler and Hamilton, 1995).
In Japan, patents are regularly issued for what in the United States would be considered
product llne extensions. Upon filing, patents become a matter of public record. According to
Herbig (1995), this provides more time to learn about the innovation; decide if its worth
developing; and then replicate, circumvent, or ignore the patent. Competitors can file to delay the
patent and then proceed to explore what is being patented. Unlike, in the United States, in Japan
a family philosophy exists. An innovation does not exist merely for the inventor or inventing firm
but for the benefit of the country as a whole. The entire Japanese patent system is aimed at
avoiding conflict and promoting cooperation through cross-licensing (Melloan, 1988). Japan
honors "first to apply," whereas the United States honors "first to invent." American patent
applications must disclose all "prior art" thus proving that they have something distinctly new and
different. Whereas the American system protects individuals, the Japanese system balances
individual rights with broader social and industrial interests. There is a critical shortage of patent
attorneys in Japan which helps explain that obtaining a patent in Japan takes considerably longer
(four to six year versus two years) that it does in the U.S. As long as it is easier to copy under
Japanese law, Japanese companies will continue to do so. Japan has been reluctant to tighten
inteUectual property laws, especially those concerning patents, believing that the country still
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needs easy access to the creative ideas of the West, in particular those of United States (Herbig,
1995).
Recently, however, intellectual property issues have become an integral part of the bilateral
economic discussions between the U.S. and Japan embodied in the United States-Japan
Framework for a New Economic Partnership, better known as the "Framework Negotiations."
Under the Framework initiated on July I0, 1993, Japan committed to achieving "tangible
progress" toward market access and the use of objective criteria to assess implementation of the
agreement. During 1994, two bilateral agreements were concluded under the Framework Working
Group on Intellectual Property Rights. Under the fwst bilateral agreement (January 20, 1994),
Japan agreed that patent applications could be filed in English and that translation errors could
be corrected after patent issuance. The U.S. agreed to change the patent term to 20 years from
the filing date instead of 17 years from grant date. Under the second bilateral agreement (August
16, 1994), the JPO agreed to introduce, by April I, 1995, legislation to end the practice of allowing
third parties to oppose a competitor's patent before it is granted and, by January I, 1996, to put
in place an accelerated patent examination procedure that will enable applicants to obtain
disposition of their patent applications within 36 months, upon request; and by July I, 1995, end
the practice of awarding dependent patent compulsory licenses, which can force patent holders
to license the use of their technology to competitors, thus limiting their exclusive rights to their
inventions (Kotler and Hamilton, 1995).
Differences between the two systems. The U.S. and Japanese patent systems are shaped
by fundamentally different purposes. In the United States, the patent system exists to provide an
incentive for innovation by rewarding an inventor with the right to exclude others from practicing
his or her invention. That reward is made in exchange for a full, complete, and enabling
disclosure of the invention to the public. In contrast, the Japanese system focuses more on the
goal of promoting Japanese industry and technological development by diffusing patent
information through Japanese industry. The current system encourages corporate strategies that
promote extensive filings, cross-licensing, and strategic filings. Public disclosure and long patent
pendency is often used as a tool to dilute or prevent any reward to the inventor. In short, Japan
interprets and uses its patent regime distinctively. Japan measures its rewards for invention in
terms of social rather than individual benefits. (For greater detail concerning the differences
between the two systems, see Kotler and Hamilton, 1995, pp, 25-36. Table 2, p. 37, contains the
major differences between the U.S., Japanese, and European patent systems.)
The following section outlines the key differences between the U.S. and Japanese patent
systems. In addition to the structural differences between the two patent systems, several aspects
of patent practice and procedure differ between the United States and Japanese systems. The
most obvious difference between the Japanese and U.S. systems is that the Japanese system, like
that of most countries in the world, is aflrst-to-flle system, whereas the U.S. system is aflrst-to-
Invent system. The first-to-file system entitles patent rights for the invention irrespective of
whether that individual was, in fact, the first to invent the product, process, or design. This
system promotes rapid filing of a large number of applications that can be prepared quickly, are
narrow in scope, and often represent mere incremental advances. Another significant difference
between the Japanese and U.S. patent systems is that Japan requires public disclosure of aU
patent applications within 18 months of filing. In the United States, applications are maintained
in confidence up through the issue of the patent. In Japan, a patent takes an average of six to
seven years to be issued compared to about 10 months in the United States.
There are substantially different legal bars to patentability between the United States and
Japan. In the United States, a patent is barred if the invention is placed on sale, described in
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printed publication, or publicly used more than one year prior to the application filing date. (If
an application is filed within the grace period, however, such public disclosures are not
necessarily fatal to obtaining a valid patent.) In Japan the grace period is shorter, only six
months, and the set of circumstances in which the grace period applies is much more limited.
Japanese law respecting public disclosures by use or sale also differs from that in the United
States. In Japan, a disclosure must actually be made to the public to act as a bar and the set of
events that may trigger a bar is narrower in Japan than in the United States. In the United
States, a patentee may refuse to license other parties and the government can demand licensing
only for limited reasons of national security. In contrast Japanese law allows interested parties
to acquire a compulsory license to the patented invention in several circumstances. The Ja-
panese patent system provides for pre-grant opposition to the award of patent rights. The JPO
allows third parties to *oppose" or object to a pending patent application by submitting reasons
why it should not be granted. The U.S. system allows no such provision.
Japanese patent applications must be filed in Japanese. In contrast, U.S. applications may
be filed in a foreign (non-Engllsh) language as long as the initial foreign-language filing is followed
within two months with a verified English-language translation. Each U.S. patent application is
examined unless abandoned. In Japan, however, an applicant must specifically request
examination and that request must be made within seven years of filing. Stringent U.S. Patent
Office rules govern the duty to disclose information of which one is aware that is material to
patentability. In Japan, there is no similar duty. Finally, unlike in the United States, a challenge
to a patent's validity is not brought before the courts, but instead directly to the JPO.
A REVIEW OF THE JAPANESE AIRCRAFT INDUSTRY
Our review of the Japanese aircraft industry is brief. Designed to establish a contemporary (i.e.,
World War II to 1996) perspective, it is not comprehensive and only partially analytical; we have
leR that task to others. (See, for example, Barber and Scott, 1995; Council on Competitiveness,
1996; Cravens, Kirk, Downey, and Lauritano, 1992; Frenkel, 1984; Friedman and Samuels, 1993);
Johnson, Tyson, and Zysman, 1989; Lopez and Herzfeld, 1991; Moran and Mowery, 1994;
Mowery, 1990, 1987; Mowery and Rosenberg, 1985a, 1985b; Mowery and Teece, 1993; Moxon,
Gerginger, and Michael, 1985; National Research Council, 1994; Roehl and Truitt, 1987; Sabbagh,
1996; Samuels and Whipple, 1989a; Schwartz, 1996; Todd and Simpson, 1986; U.S. Congress,
Office of Technology Assessment, 1991 ; Yoshlno, 1986.) Todd and Simpson (1986) indicate that
the international economic system, of which Japan is apart, is characterized by at least three
important tendencies--(a) the concentration of political, economic, and military power; (b) the
transnationalization (i.e., globalizatlon) of markets, production, and finance; and (c) the
importance of control over technology. The latter is essential to the accumulation and retention
of political, economic, and military power and for states to position themselves in a global
economy. Consequently, states, especially those with capitalist economies such as Japan,
"intervene" in the market by developing industrial policies and strategies designed to strengthen
and expand their competitive positions in the international, global economy.
Together with fiscal and monetary policies and strategies, industrial policies and strategies
constitute one element of a nation's basic economic structure. Countries like Japan employ a
variety of public policies and strategies to facilitate the development of industries (and firms) that
are at the forefront of technological development. A salient feature of these policies and strategies
has been to "target" certain high technology industries and firms as "recipients of special state
attention and largesse" (Todd and Simpson, 1986, p. 209). They are almost always "knowledge-
intensive" industries that generate a substantial multiplier or spill-over of adaptable knowledge
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for use by other industries. Aircraft production is one such industry. Japan has targeted the
aircraft industry as one of three key technologies for the twenty-first century. Government
support for this industry, one in a long succession of targeted industries, is seen by Japan as
another step up the technological ladder (U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, 1991 ).
Coveted for its knowledge and technological linkages to a variety of other high-value added
industries, aeronautical R&D is viewed by MITI as a knowledge-intensive endeavor, the results of
which are applicable and can be "spun on" to a wide range of disciplines and industries (Figure
1). Progress in aeronautics can promote advancements in a number of technologies, and It is
critical for the development of technologlcally-oriented societies like Japan's. The government
of Japan believes that aircraft production provides knowledge and technology that complement
Japan's strengths in such areas as materials, microelectronics, and computer-aided design and
manufacturing (CAD/CAM)(Mowery and Rosenberg, 1985b). In targeting aircraft production, MITI
has selected an industry where, from a long-range point of view, income elasticity of demand is
high, technological progress is rapid, and labor productivity rises fast. With World War II as a
backdrop, three aspects of Japan's efforts to build an aircraft industrymimportation of U.S.
(military) aeronautical technology, indigenous production, and international collaborationmare
profiled.
An indigenous Japanese aircraft industry existed prior to World War II (Samuels, 1994,
Chapter 4). It became the largest and the most technologically sophisticated in the world during
World War II. During the peak period ofwartlme production, the Japanese aircraft industry was
producing 25 000 airframes and 40 000 engines per year (Mowery, 1990). The same Japanese
companies that produced aircraft also produced a number of military and non-military products.
(Diversity is a hallmark of Japanese industrial policy.) Japan's pre-World War II industry was
(a) promoted for national purposes; (b) organized to import, absorb, and apply external knowledge
Control Mateflals Structural Aerodynamics Engine Avionics
Technologies Processing Technologies Technologies
Figure I. Japanese Technology Spin on Model.
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and technology; and (c) focused on developing a domestic product-manufacturing capability
(National Research Council, 1994). In 1945, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers
(SCAP) dissolved the Japanese aircraft industry, prohibited the production of aircraft, and
dismantled the aircraft firms that had been consolidated between 1928 and 1937 (Mowery, 1987).
All flights of Japanese aircraft ceased. American occupational forces took over all aircraft
production facilities. In August 1945, the SCAP unveiled a program to destroy all military and
civilian aircraft before the end of the year. In November, the Imperial Japanese government was
instructed to abolish all governmental and semi-governmental bodies concerned with aviation.
The RD&P of all aircraft and components, even for model airplanes, was banned (Samuels, 1994).
Importation of U.S. (Military) Aeronautical Technology
The end of the military occupation of Japan by the SCAP effectively removed the prohibition
on aircraft production. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 accelerated the reemergence of
the Japanese aircraft industry. With the signing of a U.S.-Japanese treaty in 1952, the ban on
aircraft production was formally lifted. By 1953, Japanese industry had orders for more than two
million manhours of overhaul and aircraft repair work for the U.S. military. Showa Aircraft
received the contract to overhaul U.S. Navy fighter planes, trainers, and transports. Kawasaki
received a similar contract from the U.S. Air Force that same year. In 1953, Mitsubishi received
the contract to overhaul B-26 bombers. By 1955, Japanese industry was repairing and
overhauling all U.S. Navy aircraft in the Far East. This activity provided an essential "learning-by-
doing" experience, a critical first step in rebuilding the Japanese aircraft industry.
In July 1954, the Japanese Diet enacted the Aircraft Manufacturing Enterprises Law, which
controlled entry into the industry, allowed industry-wide collaboration, exempted aircraft
manufacturers from the country's antimonopoly laws, and otherwise provided the foundation for
future aircraft production (Frenkel, 1984). Most importantly, the law gave MITI jurisdiction over
the aircraft industry. In 1958, Japan entered another stage in the development of its aircraft
industry with the passage of the Aircraft Industry Promotion Law (Todd and Simpson, 1986). This
law established the Nippon Aircraft Manufacturing Company (a consortium of Mitsubishi Heavy
Industries, Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Fuji Heavy Industries, Showa Aircraft, Japan Aircraft, and
Shin Meiwa Industries), a 50-50 joint venture of private and public interests, with the government
bearing the financial risks and providing liberalized investment and depreciation credits (Mowery,
1990). The law also laid the foundation for the development of the YS-II, a medium-size
turboprop commercial aircraft (Frenkel, 1984).
MITI's role in industrial policy encompasses stabilizing markets, nurturing domestic
producers, and acquiring (importing) and diffusing technology. To reestablish Japan's aircraft
industry, MITI decided to acquire the requisite advanced technology through the licensed
production of U.S. military aircraft. Eager to oblige its most important Pacific ally, the U.S.
Department of Defense (DoD) willingly helped Japan undertake the production of military aircraft.
In 1954, the United States and Japan signed the Mutual Defense Assistance Act. The treaty
provided for licensed Japanese production of U.S. military aircraft for the Japanese Self Defense
Force. That same year, the U.S. DoD formally requested and provided subsidies for Japan to
undertake the licensed production of two U.S. military aircraft, the F-86 and the T-33. Under this
agreement, all production and design know-how was transferred to Japan. Furthermore,
Japanese manufacturers were allowed to produce up to 50% the aircraft's content domestically.
In 1957, Kawasaki was awarded a license to produce the Lockheed P2V-7 antisubmarine/search
aircraft with 50% Japanese content. Shin Mitsubishi Heavy Industries was permitted in 1958 to
co-produce Lockheed's F-104, with the United States agreeing to pay $75 million, more than a
quarter of the total cost (Hall and Johnson, 1970). The license to produce the F-104's engines
(General Electric's J-79) was awarded to Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries. In 1968, the
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Japan Defense Industry selected the McDonnell Douglas F-4 as Japan's new frontline fighter.
Mitsubishi Heavy Industries was granted a license to produce the aircraft (i.e., the Mitsubishi F- I )
and served as the prime contractor for the project. More than 70 Japanese firms participated in
the project, including Japan's leading electronics firms. Although the F-I failed to meet any
credible military purpose, it was a policy success in terms of domestic content (imported parts
comprised less than 2% of the total aircraft), learning-by-doing, and technology diffusion
(Samuels, 1994).
In 1970, the Japan Defense Agency indicated its intention to develop an indigenous (i.e.,
domestically produced) antisubmarine warfare aircraft rather than importing Lockheed's P-3C,
the most advanced airborne antisubmarine warfare system available. A combination of Japanese
domestic politics and pressure from the United States over an increasing U.S.-Japan trade deficit
produced a decision to purchase the Lockheed P-3C Orion, but only if a Japanese firm
participated in the aircraft' s licensed production. Kawasaki Heavy Industries served as the prime
contractor for the project that included nearly 3000 Japanese firms as subcontractors. Japan's
domestic content was twice that contained in the P2-J, the aircraft being replaced. The electronic
components were licensed separately from Lockheed's suppliers. In 1974, the Japan Defense
Agency announced its plans to replace its aging F- 104 frontllne interceptor. Again the choice was
indigenous development or licensed co-production. The candidates for foreign (i.e., U.S.) co-
production included McDonnell Douglas' s F- 15, General Dynamics' F- 16, Grumman' F- 14, and
Northrop's F-17 (later the F-18}. By now it was clear to most everyone following Japanese
industrial policy that Japan was openingly pursuing aerospace as much to enhance the
Industry's technology base as to protect the nation (Frenkel, 1984). In December 1977, the
Japan Self Defense Agency selected McDonnell Douglas' s F- 15 as Japan' s frontline interceptor.
As Samuels (1994) points out, the F-15 is a Mach 2.5 advanced fighter aircraft that carries
some of the most advanced avionics and weapons systems in the U.S. arsenal. Prior to 1974, the
United States was still willing to license aeronautical technology to Japan. However, for the first
time, transferring state-of-the-art aeronautical technology from the United States to Japan became
an issue. Not only was the United States willing to transfer state-of-the-art aeronautical
technology for reasons of national security, but it was also willing (for the first time) to co-produce
an advanced fighter aircraft before Itsflrst upgrade. According the Chinworth (1992, p. 92),
"economic concerns were being subjugated to the perceived need of retaining balance in the
political relationship because of Japan's strategic position." In June 1978, the United States and
Japan signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that established clear limits on the transfer
of technology. The MOU reduced the percentage of Japan's domestic content to about 55%,
declared certain technology to be "unreleasable," and contained provisions for deriving "flowback"
of technology to the United States. The Japanese benefitted considerably from the agreement.
The F-15 co-production transferred more technology to Japan than any previous co-production
project, including such capabilities as composite material processing and bonding, a full range
of avionics and flight software, and fly-by-wire integration. Chinworth (1992) reported that some
of the licensed U.S. technology was used by the Japanese to compete with the original licensor
(e.g., Honeywell) in overseas and U.S markets, including component suppliers to Boelng's civil
aircraft programs. A U.S. Congress, General Accounting Office (GAO} (1992) report indicates that
considerable knowledge and technology acquired from the project was successfully diffused to
several non-aerospace Japanese industries.
In July 1982, Japan's National Defense Council approved funds in their 1981-1986 five-year
plan to purchase 24 Fighter Support-Experlmental (FS-X) aircraft. The Justification for the new
aircraft was twofold: after 1981, Japan assumed the responsibility for protecting its territory,
airspace, and sea lanes out to 1000 miles, and Japan's heavy industry companies needed new
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aircraft projects badly to utilize depressed shipyard and other heavy industry capacity. According
to Samuels (1994), the FS-X was born of both military threat and the need to nurture domestic
industry. To MITI and the Japanese aircraft industry, the FS-X represented the long awaited
opportunity to acquire the RD&P needed to create a state-of-the-art, indigenous "Rising Sun"
fighter aircraft. However, technical (e.g., avionics) and structural (e.g., metal fatigue) obsolescence
was driving the need to replace both the F-l and the F-4, and many observers believed that Japan
had neither the technical expertise nor the financial resources to build a In-st-rate, indigenous jet
fighter. U.S. observers concluded that the timetable did not allow enough time for indigenous
development and, consequently, Japan would ultimately settle on co-production or purchase of
a U.S. fighter. On the other hand, if Japan chose indigenous development, the U.S. aircraft
industry would provide certain components, most likely the engines. To the surprise of some
observers, Japan embarked on a Service Life Extension Program (SLIP) that involved reinforcing
and refitting the F-4EJ with advanced avionics and armaments. The SLIP concept and the
technology were imported from the U.S. where such programs were commonplace in the defense
industry. In 1984, Japan announced that the F-4EJ would last another five years. The SLIP gave
something to everyone. Japan received additional time for indigenous development, the avionics
were purchased from U.S. producers, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries obtained experience integrating
digital avionics, and funding for an indigenous "Rising Sun" fighter aircraft was delayed (Samuels,
1994).
Japan now had four choices: (a) indigenous development, (b) reconflguration of an existing
aircraft, (c) co-production or co-development of an aircraft, and (d) purchase an existing (i.e., off-
the-sheli_ foreign aircraft. Japanese politics favored indigenous development; however, neither the
U.S. government nor the U.S. aircraft industry was anxious for Japan to develop an indigenous
fighter. In 1985, the U.S. formally took up the issue and pushed for another co-production or co-
development program. By 1987, the U.S. Congress turned its attention to the FS-X issue. Owing
largely to an increasing trade deficit and the illegal sale by Toshiba of milling equipment to the
Soviets, Japan's proposal for co-development of a completely new FS-X was rejected. In October
1987, Japan announced that a "lightly modified" U.S. aircraft, either the F-15 or F-16, would be
procured. The F-16, which offered the most room for applying indigenous Japanese aeronautical
technology, was selected. A June 1988 MOU stated that General Dynamics would furnish F-16
technology and assist in systems integration and, in return, General Dynamics would have access
to all technology brought to the project by the Japanese. The FS-X MOU also contained a set of
rules governing the transfer of knowledge and technology: Japan received access to some of the
United States' most sophisticated aeronautical technology. In return, the Japanese agreed to
return any improvements they made at no charge and without being asked, and ffasked and paid,
they would make available any original (i.e., nonderived) Japanese technology used in the
program. They also agreed to make an exception to Japanese patent law: U.S. aircraft firms
could have military patents held confidentially at the Japanese Defense Agency instead of openly
at MITI (Samuels, 1994). The MOU also specified that 40% of the engines would be
U.S.-manufactured. General Electric was selected over Pratt & Whitney and agreed, as a
condition of sale, that Isikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries would produce more than 50% of the
engines under license in Japan (Samuels and Whipple, 1989b).
The FS-X project would serve the interests of both countries: Japanese knowledge and
technology would improve U.S. fighter aircraft capabilities and Japan would receive U.S.
assistance in the design and development of an advanced Jet fighter. U.S. critics of the FS-X
project viewed co-production as the next stage in the process of(Japanese) indigenous production
and an important step in their development as a world class (civil) aircraft industry. Japanese
critics were convinced that the United States was participating in the FS-X project simply to
improve (at Japanese expense) the capability of its fighter aircraft and that the United States
would be acquiring knowledge and technology paid for by the Japanese. A skeptical U.S. Congress
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viewed the FS-X project in the broader context of trade and economic policy, held hearings, and
demanded an interagency (i.e., Commerce, Defense, and Trade) review of the MOU (Shear, 1994).
The U.S. and Japan signed a "clarified" MOU in April 1990 that reportedly contained many of the
terms included in the original agreement, reaffirmed the workshare percentages, and denied
Japan access to flight control source codes having direct commercial application. In October
1992, an agreement for co-production of flight control software between Bendix Corporation and
Japan Aviation Electronics was signed (Samuels, 1994).
Indigenous Production
The strategic vision of an indigenous aircraft industry was shared by MITI and Japan's heavy
industries. The vision was one of an indigenous aircraft industry that would rest on the shoulders
of Japan's already established manufacturing industries (Samuels and Whipple, 1989). As the
aircraft industry grew in size and technical sophistication, the resulting knowledge and technology
would diffuse throughout Japan's manufacturing industries. The strategy was simple: create
an indigenous aircraft industry by developing a coordinated group of Japanese aircraft
manufacturers that could collaborate and share (explicit and tacit) knowledge and technology.
Careful project selection would raise the competence and capability of Japanese aircraft
manufacturers in airframe, engine, and avionics technologies. As part of the strategy, knowledge
and technology imported through the co-production of military aircraft and from indigenous
production would diffuse throughout the firm, to other Japanese aircraft manufacturers, and to
other Japanese industries. Scholars generally agree that this strategy dramatically increased the
capability and technical sophistication of Japan 's aircraft manufacturers and that other Japanese
industries have benefitted significantly from the knowledge and technology derived from aircraft
production. Four indigenous aircraft projectsmthe YS- 1 I, PS- 1, T-2 Trainer, and the J3 turbojet
engine---demonstrate the strategy's effectiveness.
YS-11. The passage of the Second Aircraft Promotion Law in 1958 established the policy
framework for the development of an indigenous Japanese commercial aircraft industry, laid the
foundation for the production of the YS- I I, (Japan' s first indigenous commercial transport of the
postwar era), and authorized MITI to provide 54% of the RD&P costs for development of the YS- I i.
According to Samuels (1994), the YS- i I was not about becoming a power in commercial aviation;
it was about catching up and surpassing other industrial nations by improving Japan' s balance
of trade and enhancing the technological capabilities of its heavy industries. The RD&P of the YS-
I 1, a 64-seat turboprop commercial aircraft, was a collaborative undertaking involving the Nippon
Airplane Manufacturing Company (a national policy company), six manufacturing partners, and
dozens of component suppliers. According to the plan, the engines would be purchased from
Roils-Royce and 150 aircraft would be produced between 1963 and 1970. The YS-I 1 was
introduced in 1962; in all, 182 aircraft were sold before production ceased in 1970 (Yoshino,
1986). The YS- 11 was a technical success, but it was an economic failure. The technical success
was due in part to the concurrent activities of Japanese industry throughout the 1950s and
1960s, producing military aircraft under license to U.S. producers. For example, the landing gear
on the YS-11 was adapted from the one used on the P2V-7, a military aircraft co-produced by
Kawasaki Heavy Industries and Lockheed. However, financial considerations, problems internal
to the collaborative arrangement, a limited market for a 64-seat turbo-prop commercial aircraft,
competition from established aircraft firms (e.g., Fokker), the successful introduction of
commercial Jet aircraft, and a lack of experience in marketing and sales helped to make the YS-11
a market (commercial) failure (Frenkel, 1984). The Japanese experience with the YS-11 was
similar to that experienced by the Europeans as they sought to restructure and rebuild their LCA
industry (see Chapter 17). The Japanese encountered similar obstacles, learned similar lessons,
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and, like the Europeans, continued to focus on industry collaboration and the establishment of
an indigenous aircraft industry as a strategic source of knowledge and technology.
PS-1. Japan's second indigenous project was the P-1 antisubmarine warfare plane designed
and manufactured by Shin Meiwa. Although there is some disagreement about the extent to which
Shin Meiwa borrowed from the Grumman HU-16 Albatross, there is no dispute about the
technological success of the aircraft. The Japanese hailed the PS-I as a major breakthrough in
short take-off and landing technology and as a shining example of collaboration among Japan's
aircraft manufacturers, subcontractors, and suppliers. Shin Meiwa derived enormous advantage
for its commercial businesses. Knowledge and technology acquired from the PS-1 were applied
to hydraulic equipment, auto engine controllers, automatic machinery, and the welding of exotic
metals. Lastly, the PS-1 "wave suppressing" sonar, Japan's first post war aircraft technology
export, was licensed to Martin and Grumman (Samuels, 1994).
T-2 Trainer. Successor to the T-1, the T-2 was a product of industrial policy. Indigenous
production of the T-2 had little to do with military roles and missions. The T-2 provided Japanese
aircraft manufacturers with valuable independent design, development, and systems integration
experience. It also helped establish Japanese competence in supersonic airframes and avionics,
and it served as the basis for developing Japan's first supersonic jet fighter, the F-I. As with
virtually all of the co-production work undertaken by Japanese aircraft manufacturers, the T-2
was a collaborative undertaking. The Adour engine, a product of a joint venture involving Rolls-
Royce and Turbomeca, was selected to power the T-2, a point to which we will return shortly. The
T-2 would not have been possible without the considerable knowledge, technology, and learning-
by-doing and learning-by using experience garnered from co-producing such U.S. military aircraft
as Lock-heed's T-33 trainer. Co-production usually included the transfer of data packages that
incorporated product designs and specifications, process specifications, tools or tool specifications,
and often included "knock-down" kits of the aircraft being co-produced (i.e., assembled). The T-2
is significant for two reasons: it helped Japanese aircraft manufacturers establish the RD&P
necessary to produce a supersonic jet fighter, the F-l, and it generated considerable knowledge,
technology, and experience that was applied to other Japanese industries (Samuels, 1994).
J3 Turbojet Engine. The Adour engine was selected to power the T-2 because, from the
Japanese perspective, it provided access to an entirely different design configuration from that
found in U.S. made jet engines. However, according to Samuels (1994), the Adour was not the
abundant source of technology originally envisioned by he Japanese. Consequently, the Japanese
redoubled their efforts to develop indigenous jet engine technology. It is worth noting that
Japanese aircraft engine development is a product of MITI industrial policy that began with the
creation of a collaborative (industry) study group in 1953. Working closely with the U.S. DoD,
MITI arranged for the U.S. Air Force to invite Japanese engineers to tour the facilities of aircraft
engine manufacturers in the U.S. and to have access to the technical reports produced by the
(U.S.) National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA). The U.S. Air Force provided a working
Allison J-33 Jet engine and an engineer from Allison for one year, free of charge. Detailed
instructions, blueprints, the operator's manual, detailed sketches of production tools and jigs,
and tools were also provided to the Japanese. In 1953, the Japan Jet Engine (Consortium)
Company was formed to create and deliver to MITI the JO-1 engine.
The JO-I was heavier and noisier that the J-33 and never powered an airplane. However,
having access to and considerable experience with (repairing and maintaining) U.S. military
engines, the consortium was convinced that it could become "a player in the market" for military
jet engines. Plans for a (three-ton) J-I were declared by MITI to be "overly" ambitious and the
consortium switched to a smaller J-2 engine that never went beyond the drawing board. Rather
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than license a foreign engine, the consortium was given yet another "opportunity to learn," and,
in October 1956, the consortium delivered three (prototype) J-3 engines. However, the engines
could not be produced in time to power the T-I trainer. Consequently 20 jet engines were
purchased from the U.K. Completed J-3 engines were eventually fitted to T-1 trainers and were
later adopted as a booster engine for the P2J aircraR.
As with other aircraft projects undertaken by Japan, the lessons learned from producing jet
engines were substantial. Japanese aircraft manufacturers learned that aircraft engines are more
difficult and take longer to develop than do airframes, producing engines involves tremendous
opportunity costs, and access to foreign (engine) knowledge and technology was essential if Japan
were to develop an indigenous aircraft engine capability. Finally, as with other indigenous aircraft
projects, substantial amounts of knowledge, technology, and experience were applied to other
Japanese industries.
International Collaboration
Early in the 1980s, MITI, in its Vision oflndustrlal Structure for the 1980s, identified LCA as
a key Japanese industry for the 1990s. Four attributes make LCA production desirable--high
value-added characteristics, minimal environmental pollution, high knowledge intensity, and
linkages between aircraft and other high technology industries (Mowery, 1990). It is important
to note that MITI focused on LCA production and not on the production of commuter and general
aviation aircraft and helicopters. (Although LCA became MITI's focus, Japanese aircraft
manufacturers remain in the business of producing general aviation aircraft and helicopters.)
MITI reasoned that the knowledge, technology, and production skills and techniques involved in
LCA production are of such sophistication as to ensure Japan's technological lead in the
industry. The ministry further reasoned that such sophistication could be used to establish and
maintain existing strategic alliances and technology linkages between the aircraft and other
Japanese high technology industries. Finally, from military co-production and the YS- 11 experi-
ence, MITI concluded four things. First, the market, both domestic and foreign, for military
aircraft was relatively small, cyclic, and well established. Second, the small size of the domestic
(Japanese) market (coupled with the lack of a mechanism for international sales and a launch
customer) was insufficient to support commercial aircraft production. Third, the RD&P costs are
so great that no one firm (or consortium of Japanese firms) can assume the risk associated with
launching a new LCA. Fourth, Japanese industrial policies, industry structure, and airframe and
engine consortia combine to make Japan ideally suited to participate in joint ventures as
subcontractors and rlsk-sharing partners with established LCA producers (e.g., Boeing).
Participation in Joint ventures offered the best opportunity for Japan to participate in the research,
development, production, and marketing of LCA (Mowery, 1987).
The four Japanese heavy industry companiesmFuji, Ishikawajima-Harima, Kawasaki, and
Mitsubishi--became subcontractors to U.S. LCA producers. Fuji manufactured rudders for the
Boeing 747. Kawasaki produced entry doors for the Lockheed- 101 I, outer trailing-edge flaps for
the Boeing 747, actuator transmissions for the Boeing 727, and inner flaps and wing ribs for the
Boeing 737. Mitsubishi built engine transport kits for the Boeing 757 and inner trailing-edge flaps
for the Boeing 747 and assembled tail cones for the McDonnell Douglas DC-IO. MITI established
the Japanese Aircraft Development Fund (JADC) in 1986 to support Japanese participation in new
international LCA programs. The JADC reflects MITIs decision in the 1980s to foster international
collaboration as the major mechanism for strengthening Japan's domestic aircraft industry
(National Research Council, 1994). The JADC made it possible for Japanese companies to become
rlsk-sharing partners with Boeing in developing the 777.
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The RD&P of an LCA is a high-risk venture compounded by technical and marketplace
uncertainty. The Boeing 777 is no exception. The RD&P of the 777 cost the Boeing company
more than $ 5 billion. The unit (per plane) cost approximates $150 million. The Boeing 777 has
more than 3 million parts, 132 500 of which require sophisticated engineering. The economics
of LCA production pushes companies like Boeing to form international alliances and linkages to
share risks (National Academy Press, 1994; Golich. 1992). A notable feature of the Boeing 777
is its substantial international component, including the outsourcing of certain production-related
activities and components. About 15-20% of the components are foreign-made (Figure 2)
(Schwartz, 1996). The JADC, a consortium of the three largest Japanese manufacturers, provides
about 21% of the aircraft's frame, or 10% of the overall plane. MITI provided $18.2 million, in
the form of low-cost loans for the nonrecurring costs, to support JADC's participation in the
Boeing 777 project. The Japanese Development Bank allocated $31.1 billion to finance Japanese
involvement in the B-777 and two other ventures (Council on Competitiveness, 1996).
Engine (propulsion) is a key enabling technology underlying LCA production. Substantial
technical and marketplace uncertainty is associated with the production of jet engines for LCA.
The economics {i.e., capital and risk) involved In the production of LCA engines pushes companies
to form international alliance and linkages to share risk and to gain market entry. The two U.S.
manufacturers of jet engines for LCA--GE Aircraft Engines and Pratt & Whitney (a division of
United Technologies )--have extensive, long-standing alliances and linkages with Japan (National
Academy Press, 1994). For example, International Aero Engines, which produces the V2500 jet
engine, Includes Pratt & Whitney, Rolls-Royce, Fiat, MTU, Ishikawajima-Harima, Kawasakl, and
Mitsubishi in what Mowery (1994) describes as one of the most complex joint ventures in the LCA
industry. GE, whose association with Japan in engine technology dates back to the 1950s,
collaborates with Ishlkawajima-Harima in the development of the GE90 engine. {The GE90 is the
first of what GE hopes to be a new family of large engines for LCA). In addition to Ishikawajima-
Harlma, which has an 8% share in the program, SNECMA (France) holds a 25% share, and Fiat
(Italy) holds an 8% share. Both GE and Pratt & Whitney participate in the Japanese
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Supersonic/Hypersonic Propulsion Technology Program (JSPTP or HYPR). The ultimate program
goal Is the development of a scale prototype turbo ramjet, Mach 5. methane-fueled engine.
Finally. Mowery (1994) notes that up to now, the risk and cost of LCA engine development could
be reduced by applying the often substantial amount of "spill-over" or dual-use knowledge and
technology derived from the development of engines for military aircraft.
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES AND TECHNOLOGY LINKAGES
The globallzatlon of knowledge and technology has contributed to the creation of a global economy
(Levitt, 1988). Badaracco (1991) makes four points about the globalization of knowledge (and
technology)---(a) the pool of available knowledge (and technology) is Increasing as developed and
developing countries devote more of their resources to the creation of knowledge; (b) worldwide.
the number of organizations and individuals producing, transferring, and using knowledge is
increasing; (c) global transportation, access to, and Improvements in communications combine
to hasten the portability of knowledge: and (dl firms are creating alliances and linkages as a
means of accessing (Importing) external sources of knowledge and technology. A firm's ability
to recognize the value of external knowledge and technology, assimilate, absorb, and apply them
for commercial purposes Is critical to Its innovative capability (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). The
Importation of knowledge and technology is a hallmark of post World War II Japan. At the
national and organizational levels, public policy and numerous alliances and linkages are used
by the Japanese to Import knowledge and technology worldwide {Peck and Goto, 1981; Smltka,
1991 ). Competitively, this Is Important, considering the inability of the United States to match
Japan as a quick and effective user of external knowledge and technology (i.e., using knowledge
and technology developed outside of the innovating f'trm) (Mansfield, 1988).
Background
Competitiveness is a function of a firm's ability to innovate quickly and efficiently. Against
a backdrop of intense global competition, increasing costs of producing knowledge and technology
(internally), and dramatic reductions in product life cycles, make a firm's abillty to create and
apply knowledge and technology all the more important. This is very important In such
knowledge-intensive Industries as aerospace. Intensive global competition has given rise to the
creation of national and transnational alliances and linkages (e.g., joint ventures and license
agreements) as a means of obtaining (external) knowledge and technology (Killing, 1980; Merifield,
1989; Ohmae, 1989; Ouchi and Bolton, 1988). Badaracco ( 1991 ) states that neither alliances nor
knowledge-based competition is new. Alliances between nations for protection and trade have
existed for centuries. What is new is the way in which alliances and linkages are changing
competition in the global marketplace (Lewis, 1995). Simply put, an alliance is a partnership that
enhances the competitive strategy or position of two or more firms by providing for their mutual
benefit access to explicit and tacit knowledge, technologies, skills, products, processes, or
materials (Pister, 1988).
Yoshino and Rangan (1995) define a strategic alliance as possessing simultaneously the
foUowing three necessary and sufflclent characteristics: (a) the two or more firms that unite to
pursue a set of agreed upon goals remain Independent subsequent to the formation of the alliance,
(b) the partner firms share the benefits of the alliance and control over the performance of
assigned tasks (perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of alliances and the one that makes
them so difficult to manage), and (c) the partner firms contribute on a continuing basis in one or
more key strategic areas. Alliances and linkages are formed for a multitude of reasons that
include securing capital, obtaining market access and increasing market share, lowering risks and
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costs, and gaining access to and creating new knowledge and technology. Leonard-Barton (1995)
states that companies usually create alliances for one of two reasons--to forestall a competitor's
partnership with the targeted ally or to plug a hole in their own knowledge or technological
capability. Further, she notes three types of alliances: supply, which are formed to minimize the
cost of trade and product exchange; poslttonlng, which help firms create or overcome market entry
barriers; and learning, which are used to augment internal knowledge.
The use of alliances and linkages to access or acquire external knowledge and technology may
take the form of a *multiplicity of relationships" (Leonard-Barton, 1995) including licensing, co-
development, joint ventures and programs, mergers, and participation in R&D and research
consortia. Collaboration among competitors for the production and sharing of knowledge and
technology has a rather long history in Japan, although it is a relatively new development in the
U.S. Alliances among U.S. firms competing in the same product markets have been limited by
legal proscriptions. Changes in the antitrust provisions of the U.S. Code in the late 1970s now
permit R&D collaborative ventures among competitors. Passage of the National Cooperative
Research Act (P.L. 98-462) gave rise to such U.S. research consortia as the Semiconductor
Research Corporation (SRC), the Microelectronics and Computer Corporation (MCC), and
Sematech (Heaton, 1989; 1988).
Japanese and U.S. Alliances and Linkages in Biotechnology and Semiconductors
Alliances and linkages, in the form of interfirm research collaboration, are widespread,
structurally diverse, and increasing rapidly in Japan. In fact, collaboration is the defining feature
of Japanese research and is commonplace in Japanese knowledge-intensive industries. A study
by Nlwa and Goto (1993) bears this out. The results show that (a) R&D collaboration in Japan
has increased and will increase in the future; (b) collaboration is undertaken to economize R&D
resources and to reinforce technological potential based on synergy effects; (c) a variety of
relationships is involved and differs according to industry type; (d) the goals, management strat-
egies, and outcomes were clearly established and agreed to by the participants; and (e) there was
a strong international component in many of the collaborative efforts.
We now focus on the international aspects of Japanese and U.S. alliances and linkages in two
areas-----blotechnology and semlconductors and two studies conducted by the National Research
Council. These studies examined the scope and nature of alliances and linkages between the U.S.
and Japan, the forces behind these linkages, and their impact on the future competitiveness of
the U.S. in blo-technology and semiconductors (National Research Council, 1992b and 1992a).
Biotechnology. The U.S. is a world leader in biotechnology. Biotechnology and the
pharmaceutical industry have been rated second to computer software and related services in
terms of thelr total value creation among U.S. knowledge-intensive companies created since 1965.
Likewise, government and industry in Japan have identified biotechnology as a key technology for
future industrial growth and are working together to increase R&D investment in this field.
Furthermore, Japan, as a matter of public policy, emphasizes technological commercialization,
and uses alliances and linkages with firms and institutions in several countries, in particular the
U.S., to import, absorb, and diffuse knowledge and technology. Finally, it is important to
remember that, as they do in other disciplines, Japan and large Japanese firms invest substantial
resources in competitive intelligence--collecting the world's scientific literature, attending
conferences and symposia, following the work of the world' s leading biotechnology researchers,
monitoring U.S. patent registration activities, and visiting U.S. universities and national research
laboratories (National Research Council, 1992b).
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Blotechnology is a research- and capital-intensive industry, which involves many scientific
disciplines and for which intellectual property rights protection and government regulations are
critically important. Foreign investment, particularly Japanese investment, plays a major role in
U.S. and European biotechnology industries. Alliances and linkages in biotechnology include
company-to-company and company-to-universities, -national research laboratories, and
biotechnology center activities. Increased competition and co-operation between the U.S. and
Japan is inevitable as biotechnology becomes part of an increasingly global economy and
technology base. Alliances and linkages between U.S. and Japanese firms in biotechnology are
complex, involve various mechanisms, and reflect the structural characteristics of biotechnology
in the two countries. From the U.S. perspective, many of the U.S. blotechnology firms are small;
hence, the need of these firms for capital to conduct R&D and the attraction of large, capital rich
Japanese pharmaceutical companies. Furthermore, large U.S. pharmaceutical companies and
biotechnology firms seek market access to Japan. For the Japanese, biotechnology is a
technological tool that permits diversification into new, higher value-added product areas.
Japanese firms also view biotechnology as a way to allocate scarce resources to improve their
productivity and international competitiveness (National Research Council, 1992b).
Alliances and linkages are important because they present an opportunity for the two-way flow
of knowledge and technology. Some involve the commercialization of existing technology and some
are established for developing new technology. How they are structured, organized, and managed
will determine, in large part, how much knowledge and technology actually flow from Japan to the
U.S. Two findings of the National Research Council (1992b) study are significant. First, the study
found a prevailing pattern of the transfer of biotechnology developed in the U.S to Japan during
the past two decades. Second, regarding alliances and linkages, the predominant flow of
knowledge and technology is and continues to be in the direction from the United States to Japan.
For example, the study found that (a) Japanese firms are increasing their ties to U.S. colleges and
universities by endowing chairs, providing institutional grants, contracting with faculty, and
educating Japanese students in the U.S.: (b) the number of Japanese conducting research in
biotechnology and related areas in the U.S. far exceeds the number of U.S. researchers doing
biotechnology and related research in Japan; (c) annually, the number of Japanese researchers
visiting U.S. biotechnology centers far exceeds the number of researchers from the U.S. who visit
Japanese biotechnology centers; and (d) although there has been an increase in the number of
alliances between and among U.S. biotechnology firms, three times as many company-to-company
linkages were formed between Japanese and U.S. companies as were formed between U.S. and
Japanese companies. These findings led the National Research Council (1992b) to conclude that:
Looking at past patterns, some wonder whether U.S. firms can develop effective strategies for making
[knowledge and technology] alliances and linkages with Japan work to their advantage in the future.
(pp. 2-3)
Semiconductors. Japan and the United States are the world's largest producers of
semiconductors. Semiconductors, which are strategically crucial to national defense, are critical
components of the electronics and communications industries and are vital to the economies of
both countries. Alliances and linkages between U.S. and Japanese firms have long played a major
role in the development and diffusion of technology and have helped shape the competitive
landscape of the semiconductor industry. From the U.S. perspective, Japanese companies often
provide American start-up companies with needed venture capital and offer large U.S. companies
access to advanced manufacturing capability and the rapidly growing Japanese market. Small
U.S. firms provide access to complementary technical capabilities that can be leveraged to obtain
a stronger position, which can then be used to obtain a strong position in the new, design-
intensive semiconductor markets. The National Research Council (1992a) study takes the position
that, in the short term, alliances and linkages have facilitated access to the Japanese market.
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However, ff these alliances and linkages are not properly structured, they could have the long
term, one-sided consequence of transferring knowledge and technology from the United States to
Japan. For alliances and linkages to have long-term benefits to the U.S. and Japan, they must
redress such structural weaknesses as manufacturing and process technology in the U.S. and
generic research and new product design in Japan. The challenge for the U.S. semiconductor
industry is to build knowledge and technology alliances and linkages that maximize the benefits
of collaborating with Japan so that the U.S. remains a front-line player in all aspects of the
semiconductor industry (National Research Council, 1992a).
U.S. and Japanese alliances and linkages in the semiconductor industry can be placed into
the following categories: (a) R&D, (b) manufacturing, (c) marketing and service, and (d) general
purpose. Until the early 1970s, the majority of alliances and linkages fell into the R&D category
and consisted primarily of knowledge and technology being transferred from the U.S. to Japan.
The 1980s witnessed an increase in the number of alliances and linkages in manufacturing.
Overall, the number of U.S. and Japanese semiconductor-related alliances and linkages increased
in the early 1990s, with the largest increase occurring in the marketing and service category.
Alliances and linkages in the semiconductor industry are formed in order to (a) compensate for
in-house weaknesses or technology gaps; (b) fill out product lines and portfolios; (c) position the
company to enter new markets; (d) better serve an established or targeted customer base; and (e)
reduce the costs, risks, and time required to develop new products and process technology. To
reach these goals, U.S. and Japanese firms utilize assembly and testing, second-source, licensing,
fabrication, and sales agency agreements; technology trades; product and process technology
investments; and Joint ventures and developments (National Research Council (1992a).
The National Research Council study concluded that the number of U.S. and Japanese
alliances and linkages in the semiconductor industry will continue to increase for the foreseeable
future. Indeed, as foreign markets expand, so, too, will the number of U.S. alliances and linkages
with countries other than Japan increase. Consequently, alliances and linkages will continue to
be the primary mechanisms by which knowledge and technology in the semiconductor industry
are imported, absorbed, diffused, and applied for commercial purposes. How these alliances and
linkages are structured, organized, and managed will influence, in large part, the percentage of
the world's semiconductor market controlled by the U.S. However, as the study correctly points
out, a variety of methods exists, outside the realm of alliances and linkages, through which
knowledge and technology can be imported, absorbed, and diffused. Foreign countries and firms
such as those in Japan have direct and open access to knowledge and technology in the public
domain. Sources of explicit knowledge include research results published in books and journal
articles and presented at technical and professional meetings, undergraduate and graduate
training, consulting services, patent application disclosures, and participation in university-based
research. Tacit knowledge, in the form of product and process technology, can be obtained by
reverse engineering ofexistlng products, consulting services, and hiring engineers and scientists.
Finally, the study concludes that large Japanese firms view alliances and linkages from a longer
term horizon and enter the relationship with the intention of learning as much as possible in order
to strengthen their competitive position several years down the road. Their capacity for
organizational learning and their management of knowledge and technology are matched by few
firms in the United States (National Research Council, 1992a).
Japanese and U.S. Alliances and Linkages in LCA
The development of the Japanese aircraft industry is characterized by the interplay between
the push for indigenously developed knowledge and technology by Japanese industry and the use
of alliances and linkages to import, absorb, diffuse, and apply for commercial purposes external
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knowledge and technology. In Japan the government has assisted the attainment of both
objectives by providing direct and indirect financial support. The government of Japan also
promotes the diffusion and integration of knowledge and technology by creating research consortia
designed to develop the knowledge and technology needed by the domestic aircraft industry. The
Japanese government promotes many alliances and linkages in the form of international
partnerships (i.e., R&D consortia) for the purpose of acquiring (i.e., importing) knowledge and
technology.
The National Research Council (1994) examined a wide range of U.S. and Japanese alliances
and linkages relevant to the RD&P of LCA. The four Japanese "heavy" industries (Mitsubishi,
Kawasaki, Fuji, and Ishikawajima-Harima) began working as suppliers for Boeing' s 747 program,
gradually increasing their participation to become subcontractors for Boeing's 737 and 757
programs. Their work share and technical sophistication increased with the 767 program and,
over i_ne, expanded to the status of "program partnership" in Boeing's 777 program.
(Participation of the heavy industries was made possible by indirect government support and loans
from the Japan Development Bank.) For its part, Boeing obtained market penetration by selling
its airplanes to Japanese airlines; gained access to competitively priced, hlgh-quality components;
and spread a significant portion of the programs' financial risks. The Japanese "heavies" received
knowledge and technology (e.g., data exchange and engineer training in advanced computer design
techniques), long-term business, low-risk access to global aircraft markets, government support
for their industry, and have developed a world-class manufacturing capability in aircraft structural
component.
The Japanese "heavies" have made significant advances in manufacturing structural
components (e.g., fuselage sections) for LCA. Combining the knowledge and technology acquired
from U.S. military and commercial aircraft programs with their existing manufacturing capability
in the automotive and other mass production industries, the Japanese "heavies" have developed
a competitive advantage in terms of cost and quality. U.S. suppliers of LCA structural
components will have to become particularly competitive in terms of price, quality, and delivery
ff they are to match or exceed their Japanese counterparts. However, to develop world-class
manufacturing capabilities similar to those of the Japanese requires that U.S. subcontractors
make large capital investments against the prospects of a significant business base. Nonetheless,
the prospects of a constant or increasing business base for U.S. suppliers of LCA structural
components is problematic, given that U.S. LCA manufacturers consider the purchase of foreign-
made (i.e., Japanese) structural components a market penetration and sales wedge (National
Research Council, 1994). Therefore, the likelihood of an increasing business base for U.S.
suppliers must be viewed against the reality that foreign sales of U.S. manufactured LCA often in-
clude "offset" provisions that require work share and the transfer of knowledge and technology
(Barber and Scott, 1995).
The Japanese aircraft industry places considerable importance on developing a world-class
capability in the fabrication and manufacture of composite materials. Moreover, the Japanese
government and the Japanese aircraft industry view materials fabrication and manufacture as an
important entry point to participation in future international aircraft programs. The use and
importance of composite materials in LCA will increase as the cost of their fabrication and
manufacture decreases through learning-by-using and learning-by-doing. The Japanese "heavies"
have coupled imported and domestic knowledge and technology with years of experience in in-
corporating composite materials into sporting goods and other consumer products. They have
also invested substantially in manufacturing equipment and in product and process technology,
and have thereby become very proficient in the fabrication and manufacture of composite material
components for LCA. Furthermore, some of the leading producers of carbon fiber in the world are
Japanese companies. In 1994, the Japanese firm Toray was the only qualified supplier of carbon
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and resin fibers for the Boeing 777 composite tail. Through various aircraft programs that
culminated in the FS-X, Mitsubishi Heavy Industries has developed the capability of
manufacturing an entire composite wing in one piece in a process called "cocuring" (National
Research Council, 1994).
The challenge for the U.S. is made difficult by several factors. The government-industry
collaboration in developing composite materials leverages the strength of the Japanese industry" s
capabilities in manufacturing and product development, and it incorporates focused government-
funded research programs that target emerging applications. Japanese companies have free
access to the U.S. market. They are also free to form knowledge and technology alliances and
linkages with U.S. companies. On the other hand, U.S. companies often have to form alliances
and linkages with Japanese companies to acquire access to Japanese markets. Finally, Japanese
firms have direct and open access to U.S.-created knowledge and technology that is in the public
domain.
Lastly, we look at propulsion and avionics. Both U.S. aircraft engine producers, GE and Pratt
& Whitney, have longstanding and extensive alliances and linkages with the Japanese "heavies."
Likewise, both GE and Pratt & Whitney participate in the JSPTP or HYPR. The Japanese
government has committed considerable funding for technology (i.e., high- performance materials)
development and for upgrading Japan's engine development facilities. Government policy and
corporate strategy combine to position Japan as a world leader in advanced propulsion materials
and related critical technologies. Japanese government-industry collaboration has served to
position the Japanese aircraft industry to continue to participate in international engine
development programs at increased levels of technical and manufacturing responsibility. The
dominant U.S. players in avionics, the Collins division of Rockwell International and Honeywell,
have fairly extensive alliances and linkages with Japanese firms. In fact, both formed alliances
with Japanese firms to produce the avionics for the Boeing 777. These linkages have become
more important as the knowledge and technology for commercial avionics come less from defense
R&D and more from consumer electronics (e.g., fiat panel displays) and computer applications.
From the U.S. perspective, the Japanese provide the best source for a cost-efficient solution and
a reliable source of high value-added components at a reasonable price. To the Japanese, the
benefits include long-term, profitable business and new applications for existing products:
acquiring knowledge and technology; and learning about business methodology in a high-image
market. Finally, the Japanese firms stand to increase their market for consumer electronics and
computer applications as such features as passenger entertainment and communication systems
become standard on new LCA (e.g., Boeing's 777) (National Research Council, 19941.
CONCLUSIONS
Kash (1992) states that successful innovation in the international marketplace requires three
inputs--(a) capital, (b) labor, and (c) many kinds of ideas. The ideas referred to by Kash exist in
the form of knowledge. In contrast to the United States, Japan places considerable importance
on {both explicit and tacit) knowledge. Of Kash's three inputs, knowledge appears to be the
important component of Japanese Innovation. Although it is gradually changing, the traditional
view in the U.S. is that "ideas for innovation" derive from basic or fundamental research, which
is the recipient of considerable federal largesse, and from the "dual-use" provisions of (federally
funded) military and space R&D. The dominant view in Japan is that ideas for new and
improvements to existing products, processes, or services come from all points along the
innovation spectrum, but particularly from design and development engineers who are linked to
the marketing function of their firms and thereby to consumers. Furthermore, unlike the U.S.,
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Japan appears to be bothered less by the "not invented here" (NIH) syndrome; ideas for product
and process Innovation can and often do come from outside the country, and typically they come
from the United States (National Research Council, 1990).
Apart from the belief that it is fundamentally a public good in the United States and a private
(corporate) good In Japan, knowledge in Japan is an intellectual, strategic, and competitive
corporate asset. Japanese firms actively seek out, acquire (import), and use the best knowledge,
both domestic and foreign, for Innovation and product and process development. In contrast to
the prevailing attitude in the U.S., the importance of knowledge is recognized by Japanese public
policy, Industries, and firms alike. Japanese public policy fosters research collaborations,
alliances, and lInkages (Ryutaro, Okuno, and Suzumura, 1988) as a means of accessIng,
importIng, and diffusing (external) knowledge and technology (Granstrand, Bohlin, Oskarsson,
Sjoberg, 1992), and government and industry work hand-in-hand to promote the acquisition and
diffusion of knowledge (Rubinger, 1986). Overall, the Japanese appear better able than their
foreign counterparts to use existing knowledge.
The diffusion of knowledge and technology is positively Influenced by Japanese custom (Books,
1995), culture (Kingery, 1991; Saha, 1994: Tokusei, 1994; Johnson-Freese, 1993), the japanese
patent system (Kotler and Hamilton, 1995); industrial organization (Kenney and Florida, 1993),
and management (Hull, Hage, and Azumi, 1985; Liker, Ettlie, and Campbell, 1995; Westney,
1986). Competitive intelligence in Japan has both a public and a private component and is a
major contributor to technological Innovation and product and process development (Fuld, 1988).
In contrast, competitive intelligence practices in the U.S. have been limited to a few Industries,
most notably pharmaceuticals, and are frequently among the first activities to be eliminated In
times of budgetary crises as they are not considered core business strategies. Furthermore, the
ability to acquire and diffuse knowledge and technology is a critical factor in the career
development and advancement of engineers and scientists in Japan, who experience regular and
systematic transfers within their employing organizations and are consequently exposed to the
entire spectrum of the R&D process (Lynn, Piehler, and Kleler, 1993; Wakasugi, 1992). Engineers
and scientists In Japan and the United States appear to differ significantly in their information-
use and -seeking behaviors, with the Japanese using more information and relying on more
information sources and gatekeepers than their U.S. counterparts do (Lynn, Piehler, and Zahray,
1988).
Japan employs a variety of public policies and strategies to facilitate the development of
industries (and firms) that are at the forefront of technological development. A salient feature of
these policies and strategies has been the "targeting" of certain high technology industries and
firms as recipients of special state attention and largesse. The targeted industries and firms are
almost always "knowledge-intensive" organizations that generate a substantial multiplier or spill-
over of adaptable knowledge for use by other industries. Aircraft production, LCA In particular,
is one such Industry. Japan has targeted the aircraft industry as one of three key technologies
for the twenty-first century. Coveted for its knowledge and technological linkages to a variety of
other high-value added industries, aeronautical R&D is viewed as a knowledge-intensive endeavor,
the results of which are applicable to and can be "spun on" to a wide range of disciplines and
Industries. Progress In aeronautics, which can promote advancements In a number of techno-
logies, is critical for the development of technologically-oriented societies such as Japan (March,
1989). To the government of Japan, aircraft production provides knowledge and technology that
complement the country's strengths in design, development, and manufacturing. Under the
rubric of national security, foreign policy, and international trade and cooperation, the U.S.
government has actively promoted the flow of aeronautical knowledge and technology to Japan.
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Alliances and linkages continue to be a mainstay of Japanese industrial policy. The record
indicates that aUiances between the government of Japan and Japanese industry have produced
mixed results. In fact, a recent Newsweek article (Bartholet, 1997), citing Japan' s failure in high
definition television (HDTV) and the fifth-generation computer, states that the old Japanese way
of doing business--whereby government mandates and industry implements--does not work well
any more. On the other hand, the article states that Japanese industry has and will continue to
successfully use alliances and linkages to "become competitive" in industries and technologies
such as semiconductors and to become "players" in industries and technologies such as bio-
technology. According to Heaton (I 988), Japan seized upon alliances and linkages as a public
policy initiative in the 1960s as a strategy for importing, adapting, and diffusing Western
knowledge and technology throughout Japanese industry. Heaton further states that this strategy
promised to improve the competitiveness of Japanese industry in international markets within a
short period of time. Researcher and scholars generally agree that Japan has succcessfully used
alliances and linkages to develop a substantial capability in the RD&P of LCA. They differ
somewhat in their opinions regarding two points.
First, Japan has developed an indigenous capability in helicopters and civil aircraft.
Technically, Japan has the ability to build an LCA. However, it is unlikely that Japan will develop
an indigenous LCA. Defenders of this position, argue that the industry dynamics in LCA are very
different from those in biotechnology and semiconductors. Specifically, they state that the R&D
requirements are considerably higher, the up-front capital outlays are enormous, and the learning
curves are more steep than those that exist in other industries. Finally, there is the fact that the
world market is already dominated by two major LCA players-thus making the potential for a third
to overcome the barriers to entry and achieve any economies of scale in the process-somewhat
daunting. The correct scenario, they predict, is that Japanese industry will become "a" or "the"
dominant global subcontractor in LCA production. If true, the concern ofU.S, policymakers then
becomes one of "what impact is the creation of a dominant global subcontractor in Japan likely
to have on the continued viability of existing U.S. LCA subcontractors"? Second, is the issue of
*set asides" of knowledge, technology, and jobs for market access. Researchers such as Barber
and Scott (1995) predict direr consequences in terms of lost jobs and the one-way flow of
knowledge and technology. The arguments against trading jobs for market access become more
intense when the knowledge and technology being exported are paid for, in part, by federal funds
expended by the DoD and NASA and are being used in an industry that is the leading contributor
to the nation's balance of trade. Warnings concerning the exportation of knowledge and
technology are not new. Indeed, the evidence is overwhelming that during the 1970s and early
1980s, Japan received about $15 billion worth of American knowledge and technology for which
they paid a mere $1.5 billion in the form of royalties, licensing fees, and out right purchases
(Winpisinger, 1978). Although those taking a "free trade" position argue that the unrestrained flow
of knowledge and technology is essential for American firms to remain competitive in today's
global economy, supporters of "managed" trade state that knowledge and technology are not es-
thetic pursuits like music or poetry but rather they are commodities having economic and
commercial value with investment costs that can be measured, a dollar value that can be
computed, and a clear market advantage for those who will manage them as intellectual and
strategic assets. Perhaps the question for U.S. policymakers then is "can government and
industry work more closely together to guarantee that, on the one hand, the U.S. LCA sector
remains preeminent in the world while, on the other hand, ensuring that knowledge, technology,
and Jobs are not lost in the process"?
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IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. PUBLIC POLICY,
DIFFUSING KNOWLEDGE AND TECHNOLOGY, AND LCA
In Chapter 2, we stated that the creation and utilization of knowledge and technology constitute
distinct but equally complex and multifaceted aspects of the knowledge diffusion process. The
former concentrates on producing new knowledge whereas the latter focuses on the transfer and
use of that knowledge. Chapters 3 and 4 clearly demonstrate that U.S. public policy places much
greater emphasis on knowledge creation (i.e., funding basic research) than on knowledge diffusion
(i.e., funding the transfer and use of knowledge). Based on our analysis of the research and
literature, the following U.S. public policy initiatives are recommended.
Adopting a Diffusion-Orlented Technology Policy
Our analysis reveals that Japanese public policies incorporate many of the "diffusion-like"
features identified previously in Chapters 3, 4, and 17. Chief among these are the capacity for ad-
justing to technological change across the entire industry structure and the effective diffusion and
management of imported and domestically produced knowledge and technology. In contrast, the
dominant U.S. political view holds that the transfer and use of publicly funded knowledge and
technology, together with the design, development, and production of products, processes, and
services, should be left to the private sector. If U.S. industry is to enjoy a competitive advantage
based on the use of publicly funded knowledge and technology, U.S. pollcymakers need to
recognize the importance of and move towards a more diffusion-oriented policy framework. As
Branscomb (1993) notes, accelerating the speed with which knowledge and technology are diffused
is a key element in a national competitiveness strategy. But acceleration is not the only factor.
Ensuring that publicly funded knowledge and technology first reaches the individuals and
organizations that helped fund it is even more critical if the knowledge is to provide them with a
competitive edge in the global marketplace.
Utilizing Knowledge Management As a Component of a Diffusion-Oriented Technology Policy
In an attempt to maintain and regain its strength in world markets, U.S. industry is improving
the quality of its products and getting them to market faster. What is emerging is an enterprise
model that borrows from Japan's kelretsu, (which is not unlike the "groupement" arrangement
adopted by the Europeans for the RD&P of the Airbus aircraft) which rely on cooperation among
a group of manufacturers, suppliers, and financial companies. Such U.S. legislation as the
National Cooperative Research Act has enabled U.S. industries to pool their resources to do
"precompetitive" research on technology used for distinctive products. More than 250 R&D
consortiums have been created to date and many U.S. firms participate in several consortia. In
order to help create a more competitive environment and support for U.S. industry, a diffusion-
oriented policy framework should seek to accommodate the following three knowledge diffusion-
knowledge management objectives.
Optimize the diffusion and absorption of knowledge and technology resulting from
federally funded R&D to enhance economic competitiveness. This requires that the knowledge
base (i.e., the results of federally funded R&D) be managed as a capital asset and that a strategy,
an infrastructure, and mechanisms be developed that ensure the diffusion and absorption of
domestically- and foreign-produced knowledge and technology. The mechanisms should be user-
focused and the available knowledge and technology should be modelled in a user-oriented
problem-based context. Information technology and (human) intermediaries, similar to those used
in the agriculture and manufacturing extension programs, would facilitate delivery of both codified
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(explicit) and uncodlfled human (tacit) knowledge that could then be readily analyzed and
absorbed by users for problem-solving purposes.
Optimize the diffusion and absorption of knowledge and technology produced outside of
the United States. This initiative requires an understanding of the scope and value of work being
performed in other countries, the facilities at which the work is being conducted, and who the
experts are that are conducting the work. A mechanism is needed for collecting, analyzing, and
integrating foreign-produced knowledge and technology into the U.S. knowledge base.
Optimize the diffusion and absorption of knowledge through cooperative ventures. This
initiative requires increased use of aeronautical technology demonstration programs involving
DoD, FAA, NASA, industry, and universities. Such programs are recognized as relatively
successful in diffusing the results of federally funded R&D. Greater use of personnel exchange
programs among government, industry, and academic sectors would also enhance diffusion and
absorption.
LCA Knowledge and Technology Alliances and Linkages
Finally, as noted in Chapters I and 2, there are frequently intended and unintended
consequences of U.S. public policy. The intended purpose of U.S. public policy during the Cold
War was to restore a measure of Japan's defensive capability. An unintended consequence was
that Japan became the United States" economic competitor overall (Reich and Mankin, 1986) and
challenged the superiority of the U.S. aircraft component suppliers through strategic alliances and
linkages with U.S. LCA manufacturers. Challenging an industry that is critical to economic
growth and national security represents a serious threat to the United States. U.S.-Japanese
knowledge and technology alliances and linkages are a necessary reality that must be managed
to guarantee a balanced, two-way flow of knowledge and technology and to ensure U.S. pre-
eminence in aeronautics. With respect to U.S.-Japanese knowledge and technology alliances and
linkages, U.S. public policy should support the following four objectives.
Ma/nta/n U.S. technological leadersh/p. Maintaining technological leadership requires the
creation of a policy framework that embraces all aspects (e.g., intellectual property) of the process
of technological innovation; greater coordination and cooperation between the Congress and the
Executive branch and among academia, industry, and government, and a long-term view.
Maintaining leadership also requires increased cooperation among U.S. firms and greater use of
knowledge and technology alliances and linkages. Leadership requires industry and government
to keep high paying, value-added jobs in the U.S. and to protect the product and process
integration skills that underlie the competitive status of the U.S. aircraft industry.
Revitalize U.S. manufacturing capabil/ties. U.S. industry and government should work
together improve existing manufacturing performance in terms of cost, quality, and delivery.
Public policy should focus on increasing and sharing the pool of knowledge, technology, and
experience relative to aircraft development and production and provide incentives for industry to
invest in equipment and employee training (Cohen and Zyman, 1987; Winpisinger, 1978).
Encourage mutually beneficial U.S.-Japan alliances and linkages. Greater thought and
examination on the part of industry and government must be applied to determining the
Justification (i.e., goals, objectives, and measured outcomes) underlying U.S.-Japan alliances and
linkages. Those that offer U.S. industry short-term benefits but have long-term adverse
consequences should be avoided. U.S. government and industry should create mechanisms and
devote additional resources to encouraging mutually beneficial U.S.-Japan alliances and linkages
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in the following areas: {a) technical information, (b) technology benchmarking, (c) identifying and
managing critical knowledge and technologies, and (d} education and training (National Research
Council, 1994).
Ensure a level playing field for global competition. Eternal vigilance is required on the part
of industry and government to ensure continued U.S. leadership in LCA. Therefore, alliances and
linkages that transfer high paying, value-added jobs and complex manufacturing production from
the U.S. to Japan and other countries should be avoided. Existing Japanese government-industry
relationships that include low interest loans and other incentives artificially increases the
competitive position of Japanese industry and places U.S. subcontractors at a disadvantage
should be challenged through the World Trade Organization. Enforcement of intellectual property
rights should be vigorously pursued. Consequently, U.S. public policy, as recommended by the
National Research Council (1994), should seek to ensure that the policies of Japan and other
countries do not place U.S. industry at a competitive disadvantage.
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